The once progressive co-author of A Populist Manifesto with this book has written the worst kind of alternative history, one seriously colored by the view from the present, and more specifically, of those who won and those who lost, with a decided bias in favor of those who won, writes Jim DiEugenio.
Jim DiEugenio presents in five parts why, 50 years on, the Warren Report can no longer be taken seriously.
Taken as a whole, this is a valuable book. When coupled with Muehlenbeck's Betting on the Africans, much needed light has now been cast over the specifics of Kennedy's dealings with the Third World: how these broke with the past, and how LBJ and Nixon then returned them to their previous state, writes Jim DiEugenio.
After reading this volume, the only apparent betrayal will be to the consumer who plunks down $25.00 for this mess, complains Bill Davy.
It would not necessarily be surprising ... if [LBJ] had foreknowledge or tacitly approved of the assassination. ... I do not think, however, that at this date ... an explanation which ignores the larger political forces of the national security state can be taken seriously, writes Joseph Green.
The weaknesses in the arguments that LBJ initiated and masterminded the plot to kill his predecessor offered by a number of recent books are here reviewed and synthesized.
In which he attempts to convince Johnson of the necessity for a Presidential commission.
Farrell was ordered by his editor to write a book on the case based on often archaic, and probably Angleton influenced material on one hand, and people like Dick Hoagland (Mr. UFO), on the other. Working from such parameters, does Farrell honestly think that he has the ability to advance these structures of conspiracy and the different levels and layers? Or indeed does he think he is the first to try? If he does, he’s deluding himself, writes Seamus Coogan.
Jim DiEugenio continues his re-examination of Halberstam, emphasizing the near total antithesis between LBJ and JFK in terms of Vietnam (and foreign policy in general) which the book all but erased.
Although [Bundy] thought [Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest] was an entertaining and informative read, he concluded that the central thesis was just wrong. It was not the advisers—the best and brightest—who did the staff work who got us into the Vietnam War. It was the difference in the men who occupied the Oval Office. It was the difference between Kennedy and Johnson, writes Jim DiEugenio.