Kill Kennedy, by Cecil Hawthorne
Cecil Hawthorne has a Ph. D. in Theology and Society from the University of Chicago. He has written previously about how different cultures value the concept of wealth. Which might explain why this reviewer never heard of Hawthorne in the field of Kennedy assassination studies. But he has written two editions of his book Kill Kennedy, which is subtitled The Secret Files They Never Wanted You to See. It has that subtitle because it is largely based on the 2025 document release by President Donald Trump and Director of Homeland Security Tulsi Gabbard. Of course, it goes beyond that, but the overall architecture of the book arises from these documents.
I
The first section of the book is entitled The Crime and the Cover-Up. Here, he outlines the case for Kennedy being caught in a crossfire in Dealey Plaza. He cogently writes that the grassy knoll did not begin as a theory; it began as a reaction. (p. 27). He also brings up the points about Secret Service agents Forrest Sorrells and Winston Lawson signing off on the hard turn onto Elm Street. (p. 28) The House Select Committee concluded that this was not necessary; there were other ways to get to the Trade Mart without doing so. (HSCA, Vol.XI, p. 522) And he brings in the important film of the motorcade leaving Love Field and agent Henry Rybka being ordered off the rear bumper guard by Emory Roberts. (p. 29) The author also brings up other Secret Service failures, like the lack of rooftop surveillance, which allowed the crossfire to be enacted.
He then states that there was no Secret Service full internal disciplinary review. No agents were deemed negligent and then demoted, terminated or forced to resign. One local police officer said about the Secret Service, “They looked stunned. Like they didn’t expect anything real to happen that day.” (p. 31)
The book then turns to Oswald and the CIA, and then to Oswald in New Orleans. The author states that the 2025 release “reveals that agencies had standing knowledge of his location, his movement, and even his pseudonymous communications.” (p. 39) From here, the author outlines Oswald’s progress from Mexico City back to Dallas, securing his job at the Texas School Book Depository and then his capture and being held in detention. (pp. 41-42)
Hawthorne now spends four pages on Mexico City. He talks about the lack of a photographic record of Oswald there. The CIA tried to explain this away as a technical failure, an excuse which he clearly doubts. (p. 43) He offers up a 1978 memorandum from Tom Karamessines saying that the Agency “had reviewed intercepted calls placed by ‘an American male identifying himself as Lee Oswald’ from the Cuban consulate to the Soviet Embassy.” (p. 44)
About Oswald leaving Mexico, the author writes, “Border patrol made no note of his reentry. Immigration records reflect no flags. No one inquired about this embassy visits.” Based on an incomplete record, he holds out the possibility that Oswald was impersonated as part of a legend that was being developed, “an identity construct designed to confuse and misdirect.” (p. 45) He then notes how this contrasts with the usual rigor with which even minor contacts were recorded by the CIA. Therefore, it appears to be a selective loss owing to omission. But oddly, Hawthorne accepts as fact that Oswald did leave Mexico on a bus. This reviewer would even argue that point based upon the work of both David Josephs and John Armstrong. (Armstrong, Harvey and Lee, pp. pp 679-82)
Proceeding to the murder of Oswald, the author writes that the Warren Commission accepted the DPD scenario with Ruby entering into the basement through an unlocked side door. (Hawthorne, p. 58) The Commission did not accept that. Their story was that Ruby walked down the Main Street ramp to gain entry. (WR, p. 219) That tale was then frowned upon by the House Select Committee. It was the HSCA that offered the side door explanation. (Armstrong, p. 945)
II
Begun by the Dallas Police, the myth of Oswald’s guilt was then adapted by the FBI and the Warren Commission. It was pretty much enshrined by the infamous November 25th Katzenbach Memorandum: “The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large.” (Hawthorne, p. 63)
As many before him—like Walt Brown-- Hawthorne fingers Allen Dulles as the most influential member of the Warren Commission. He was in contact with CIA officers James Angleton and Dick Helms, who were the points of contact for the Warren Commission with the Agency inquiry. About this relationship, Helms wrote, “Dulles prefers to handle certain items directly. Will advise on the timeline for delivery.” (p. 66) Dulles also objected to certain intelligence officers as witnesses as they had “no direct bearing on the Oswald matter.” (ibid) According to notes by Commission staffer Howard Willens, Dulles said the American people do not understand subtlety, therefore the Commission needed a straightforward story. One staffer wrote on April 2, 1964, that, “He speaks for the Agency even when not asked to. It’s like he’s already written the ending.” (p. 67) Hawthorne concludes that Dulles had steered the investigation carefully and surgically with a career’s worth of acquired discretion. Dulles even wrote in his notes, concerning the FPCC and Cuba, “do not pursue”. (ibid)
One of Dulles’ discretions was with the medical evidence. He was particularly interested in Dr. Malcolm Perry’s declaration on the day of the assassination that Kennedy’s neck entrance wound came in from the front. Perry had been advised during the day and the night of the shooting that he should not say this. (See the documentary What the Doctors Saw and this article https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-ordeal-of-malcolm-perry)
Hawthorne mentions that, as CIA historian David Robarge later confirmed, Director John McCone wanted to limit the scope of the Commission. If the questions regarded operations not related to the Oswald case, then that would not be forwarded. McCone termed this a “benign cover up”. (p. 72). To put it mildly, as the HSCA found out years later, this imperative was carried out rigorously and systematically. And not just in relation to Oswald, but also with Jack Ruby.
Once the Warren Commission cover-up was ready, all that was then necessary was for the MSM to endorse it. Which it did wholeheartedly. Here, Hawthorne spends several pages on Operation Mockingbird. Allen Dulles had a relationship with New York Times publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger, which was revealed in a 1960 memorandum that confirmed they had meetings about “issues of mutual concern.” (p. 77) The Agency sent out packets to spin their side of the story. One CIA Domestic Contact Service cabled: “Media assets should reinforce Oswald’s Soviet leanings and emphasize his instability. No speculation on other actors.” (p. 78) At Time-Life, C. D. Jackson told Henry Luce that he had discussed the Zapruder film with the Agency. In order to minimize the visual shock, their advice was not to show Z frame 313. (p. 79)
At the St Louis Post-Dispatch, a reporter worked on a story that looked at the chain of custody for the rifle. It was edited before printing, and the journalist was later transferred. His response was “I was told directly not to inflame. Apparently, the truth has a half-life.” (p. 79). At the Washington Post, a staff memo from 1964 states, “The president and the intelligence community are aligned. Any contrary view at this stage would undermine public confidence.” (p. 79) As the author notes, all this was designed to rehearse the public for an acceptance of what the CIA knew was at least a partial cover-up. There was not a single editorial board in the MSM that displayed any skepticism about the 888-page report. In fact, they accepted it without even reading the accompanying evidence, published a month later, in the 26 volumes of testimony and exhibits. As Hawthorne later writes in a concluding chapter, this suppression helped fuel the growth of an alternative press and a conspiracy culture.
And the suppression did not stop in 1964. Hawthorne writes a few pages on the case of Michael Getler. He was a well-known MSM reporter who later became an editor at the Post. In the early seventies, he developed an interest in the mystery of Oswald in Mexico City. For this, both he and his sources came under surveillance. This was done out of a working group from the Office of Security and the Counter-Intelligence staff under the supervision of James Angleton. Getler’s byline was now on the CIA’s media watch list, usually reserved for writers from journals like Ramparts and The Village Voice. The Agency even thought of reaching out to friendly rival journalists who were loyal to them to counter Getler. (pp. 86-87)
III
In dealing with Jack Ruby, Hawthorne properly accents the connection through Cuba to Florida mobster Santo Trafficante. In this regard, he mentions the reports of Ruby moving small arms into pre-Castro Cuba. And also the relationship between a man who worked for Trafficante, and also knew Ruby, namely Lewis McWillie (p. 107). He adroitly mentions the CIA/Mafia plots in which Trafficante was involved, along with Johnny Roselli. What makes this all the more interesting is a notation made on a 1963 CIA document only released in 2025. It references a “Dallas contact familiar with Havana exfiltration procedures and nightlife financing patterns.” Handwritten in the margin is “J. Ruby”. Following this is the phrase “non-actionable asset no current operational use.” This is as close as this reviewer knows of any official acknowledgment of the Agency’s use of Ruby. (pp. 108-09)
Hawthorne brings in the key figure of Jolly West and his crucial association with Jack Ruby while he was awaiting trial. Ruby had made some odd but provocative statements while in detention. Therefore, a psychiatric evaluation was recommended. West diagnosed Ruby as having paranoid psychosis. I wish Hawthorne had mentioned Hubert Winston Smith, who was on the case before attorney Melvin Belli, and was very influential in the psychiatric evaluation of Ruby. (https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/jack-ruby-a-review-and-reassessment-part-2)
From here, the author jumps to another Cuba angle, namely the Bay of Pigs invasion. The spectacular failure of that ill-fated expedition caused Kennedy to begin a feud with the CIA. In another document declassified in 2025, Kennedy was noted to have said, “They think they’re smarter than the president. They think they’re the rightful custodians of the republic.” The Agency responded with “…continued interference from executive level may compromise the integrity of long-term strategic placements.” (pp. 128-29)
Arthur Schlesinger was placed in charge of drafting a new outline for a reformed CIA. He wrote:
We are drifting toward a state in which executive decisions are undermined by preemptive covert action. The chain of command had been disrupted not by insubordination but by structural latitude granted after World War 2 and expanded without constitutional review. (p. 131)
CIA officer Richard Helms replied with, “While the president’s directive will be executed in form, we must preserve strategic latitude in field implementation. Where operational ambiguity persists, maintaining existing discretion.” (p. 136) This likely refers to the impact of NSAMs 55, 56, 57 ceding much power to the Pentagon, which clearly the Agency did not like: “We must not cede the rhythm of execution to the uniformed services.” (p. 136)
In 2025 declassified documents, it is apparent that the Agency did not like Kennedy’s attempt at a back channel to Fidel Castro through his own emissaries. In a November 12, 1963, Office of Security memo, they say, “Agency position remains clear, parallel negotiation initiatives not sanctioned. Field officers should continue with established objectives until further notice.” (p. 143) McGeorge Bundy wrote a note, “Too many unknowns inside Agency. Actions uncoordinated. Whose orders are they following?” (ibid)
IV
This same kind of conflict exhibited itself over the Vietnam issue. In a recently declassified taping from October 1963, Kennedy said to Bundy and McNamara. “We’re not going to get trapped in that war. It’s theirs to win or lose. We’ll help them, but I’m not sending half a million men out there. We’ve seen how that story ends.” (p. 169) A week later, he said to Senator Mike Mansfield, “After the election, I’m getting out. It’s not our war, and they’re not going to drag me into it.” (ibid) Again, the CIA saw this withdrawal plan as dangerous: it would provoke internal rebellion and weaken the Saigon power structure.
It was not just the CIA. General Curtis LeMay thought it would hurt American forward basing and tactical response plans. Which would be detrimental to Air Force budgeting. (p. 173) When Kennedy was killed, LeMay’s fears were alleviated. Within ten days, President Johnson said:
I’m not going to be the first American president to lose a war. We’re going to get this thing straightened out and we’re going to do it without dancing around like we’re afraid of Hanoi. (p. 178)
Johnson tried to cover this split in policy by saying he was standing by Kennedy’s commitments, and the mission remained unchanged. But even the embassy of the United Kingdom knew LBJ was changing policy. (p. 179). After being warned by people like Sid Richardson, Johnson also dropped Kennedy’s idea of eliminating the lifetime oil depletion allowance. (p. 198)
The whole term of “a state within a state”, which Arthur Schlesinger used in drafting his new CIA plan, has become commonplace. It has now evolved into the rubric of The Deep State. Washington politicians like Senator Chuck Schumer use the phrase. Hawthorne quotes Allen Dulles on the matter: “The public sees us as analysts. We are far more than that. We shape the playing field, presidents react to the field we create.” (p. 245)
Hawthorne describes more conflict between JFK’s reformist foreign policy and the CIA. Kennedy stated:
We are bleeding resources into conflicts with no exit plans, under the assumption that absence equals defeat. This logic is a trap. Our strength lies not in omnipresence but in selective restraint. (p. 257)
To the Agency, Kennedy was questioning the whole concept of containment as defined by George Kennan back in 1947 in Foreign Affairs magazine. And he was questioning the concept of the black budget: “If we cannot even audit what we are doing, how do we know what we have authorized.” (p. 259) Finally, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy wrote a memo in October of 1963 that accented this divergence from Kennan, one which Kennedy had to have been aware of: “The president believes he is charting a new course for global leadership. Internal and external actors believe he is dismantling a system of deterrence. The rift is widening.” (p. 331)
V
Donald Trump understood the political advantage of being on the side of declassification: “Strategic declassification of JFK files positions the president as a truth-teller vs intelligence obfuscators. Leverages populist distrust of secrecy.” (p. 263) Trump lost out on this in his first term, when he bowed to the wishes of the FBI and CIA. But buoyed by the likes of Robert Kennedy Jr. and Tulsi Gabbard, he decided to switch positions in this term. But, even at that, the Deep State is still resisting. As Hawthorne writes, “The most telling feature of this release is not what it confirms, but what is still sealed.” (p. 263)
For Hawthorne, what is still classified about Mexico City tops that list. As he states, not only is there a null photographic record, but there is also the problem with any voice taps. A declassified file says that the original magnetic tape files were withdrawn or recycled by an unknown authority. The transcripts were not catalogued by standard methods, and the voiceprint match was inconclusive. This was all in direct contradiction of what the procedure should have been in the Oswald case. Because of his status as a returned defector and his alleged communication with Valeriy Kostikov, his file should have been treated with care, preserved and immediately sent to Langley. (p. 269) Later on in the book, Hawthorne wonders if David Phillips was involved in what might have been deliberate suppression. (p. 407)
David Phillips was stationed in Mexico City at the time Oswald was allegedly there. Phillips, using the name of Maurice Bishop, was also reportedly seen by Antonio Veciana in Dallas with Oswald. In relation to this, Hawthorne advances declassified CIA memos. They show that the Agency knew about Veciana and Bishop prior to the convening of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. And they were worried about it becoming public. (p. 276) Phillips said he did not recall the name Veciana in a professional context. But there is a declassified log from 1962 about Phillips being listed at a debriefing in Miami. It involved Alpha 66, and it includes an unnamed ‘A.V.,’ who was described as a group founder and Havana-trained exile asset. (p. 277)
There are also files showing the internal turmoil Phillips was under in his fear of being recognized in public as Maurice Bishop: “Appears to experience cognitive dissonance between official denial protocols and evolving personal doubt.” And the files now reveal that the CIA did use ‘Maurice Bishop’ as an alias assigned to a liaison-level contact with “urban sabotage cell in Southern U.S.” (p. 278). But Hawthorne notes that there are still files being withheld on the mystery of Maurice Bishop.
The book now segues into two sections on foreign policy: one dealing with JFK and the Northwoods dispute, one with the whole Dimona conflict with Israel and David Ben-Gurion. This website has dealt with these issues at length and in depth, so we will not delve into those aspects of the book.
Hawthorne brings up some original and interesting files that shed light on Richard Nixon’s fascination with both JFK and his murder. Nixon’s chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, wrote a memo in July of 1972 stating: “P believes files on Cuba ops and Kennedy killing are in Langley vault. Says Helms will shut down inquiry if we press Bay of Pigs pressure point.” The ‘inquiry,’ of course, referred to Watergate. But Nixon never got these files. (p. 340). And this exacerbated his suspicion and resentment about what he called “the Ivy League set”. This was an early version of the Deep State. As he said, “…the ones who think they run things no matter who gets elected.” (ibid)
Expanding on this, in September of 1972 he said, “The problem isn’t Democrats. It’s the permanent government. They survived Kennedy. They’ll survive me if I don’t push back.” (Ibid). Nixon looked at this relationship between Kennedy and himself much like Anthony Hopkins did in the penultimate scene of Oliver Stone’s film Nixon: “Jack dies and becomes a saint. I win and I’m hunted. He had the Agency in his grip and they buried it. They won’t do the same for me.” (p. 341) Interestingly, Nixon admitted, “Would never have beaten Jack. He was too quick, too polished. If he had lived, I ‘d have stayed in California law practice.” (p. 372)
All in all, this is a credible book. There are parts I wish the author had left out. For instance, he writes several pages on what he sees as a Bush connection to the case. As one can see in my reviews of John Hankey and Russ Baker, I never felt this was real. But Mr. Hawthorne has done some admirable digging in those 2025 files. And he has come up with some interesting nuggets of information. But according to him, what is being withheld promises even more.
